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A nurse believes that her employer, a hospital, is defrauding the 
government by submitting claims to Medicare and Medicaid for services 
the hospital never provided. In her complaint, the nurse alleges that 
the hospital participated in duplicative and unnecessary testing of 
patients and duplicative billing for blood draws. She also includes 
factual references to her personal conversations about the hospital’s 
policies with other employees, descriptions and technical codes for 
medical tests of the type that she alleged were falsely submitted, and 
the testing histories of two actual patients. However, she cannot provide 
billing numbers, specific dates, or copies of any bill that was sent to the 
government for these false claims. Instead, she has personal, firsthand 
knowledge of the submission of the false claims—her supervisors 
informed her of the details of the scheme to induce her to participate 
in the fraud. 
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Based on the facts given above, the Eleventh Circuit would likely 
find her complaint insufficient due to lack of details about the actual 
false claims submitted, such as dates and amounts.1 On the other hand, 
the Fifth Circuit would probably find her complaint sufficient because 
her personal knowledge of the scheme provides indicia of reliability that 
the false claims were actually submitted.2 
An engineer wishes to bring a suit for falsely certifying and shipping 
parts that did not meet the government’s specifications against a 
company that manufactures equipment for the armed forces. He works 
for a competitor of this company, so he has no personal knowledge of 
the fraudulent acts or access to any of the company’s invoices or billing 
information. In his complaint, the engineer alleges which specific parts 
were shipped and paid for by the government. He also provides inform-
ation about the contract between the company and the government. He 
alleges that the company must have submitted at least one false claim 
or the government would not have paid for the inadequate equipment. 
Without details of the actual false claims submitted—such as copies 
of invoices—the Eleventh Circuit would likely find the engineer’s 
complaint insufficient.3 The Fifth Circuit may also find his complaint 
insufficient because, even though he provided details of the overall 
scheme to submit false claims to the government, he did not provide 
any other indicia of reliability to support his claims.4 However, the 
Seventh Circuit would likely find the complaint sufficient because it 
provided enough detail of the overall scheme to infer that the false 
claims were actually submitted.5 
These hypotheticals illustrate the division among the circuit courts 
in deciding cases brought under the False Claims Act (FCA).6 The FCA 
is aimed at uncovering fraud against the United States Government 
 
1. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 
1301, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the rule requiring that 
averments of fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity applies 
to FCA claims and that the competitor failed to allege with specificity if 
or when the corporation submitted any improper claims to the government).  
2. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180,  
190–91 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the claim was stated with sufficient 
particularity without including contents of the bill, exact dollar amounts, 
or dates to prove by a preponderance that fraudulent bills were actually 
submitted).  
3. Supra, note 1. 
4. Supra, note 2. 
5. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 
854 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a relator from a competitor did not need 
to produce invoices that the defendant company submitted to customers 
at the beginning of a lawsuit since knowledge can be inferred).  
6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
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through suits brought by private citizens called relators. While Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),7 which requires a heightened pleading 
standard in instances of fraud, governs complaints under the FCA, the 
circuit courts are split in their application of Rule 9(b) to this scenario. 
The circuits’ applications range from rigid to flexible applications of 
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. Because the Supreme Court has 
declined to address this issue and because there is no single test that 
courts can use to decide whether a complaint is sufficient, courts have 
come to widely disparate decisions. This Note proposes a test under 
which Rule 9(b) will be satisfied by a complaint filed under the FCA 
that (1) pleads sufficient detail of a fraudulent scheme and (2) provides 
reliable indicia of fraudulent claims to conclude that false claims have 
been filed. 
First, this Note will discuss the FCA, contemplating its 
requirements and purpose. The Rule 9(b) pleading standard will be 
examined in general and as it applies to the FCA. Second, this Note 
will examine how the circuit courts have chosen to apply the Rule 9(b) 
pleading standard to FCA complaints, discussing the courts’ holdings 
within a spectrum of rigid to flexible applications of that rule to 
highlight the inconsistency surrounding this issue. Third, this Note will 
suggest that the pleading standard be relaxed in FCA cases to improve 
access to the judicial system for relators and avoid the informational 
asymmetry problem. 
Fourth, this Note will propose a test for courts to use when 
evaluating FCA complaints and propose factors that courts should 
consider when determining if reliable indicia have been provided. 
Finally, this Note will suggest that the “representative samples” 
approach and the “status of the relator” approach should be rejected in 
favor of the flexible approach. Not only will evaluating FCA complaints 
under this test fulfill the purpose behind the enactment of Rule 9(b), 
but it will also improve access to the judicial system for relators and 
allow the FCA to fulfill its remedial purpose. Courts should apply Rule 
9(b) flexibly to avoid the unfair burden that a rigid application places 
on relators. This Note promotes a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in 
FCA cases and works to clarify the factors courts should consider when 
applying a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in FCA cases. 
I.  Overview of the False Claims Act &  
the Pleading Requirement 
The FCA is an extremely important tool in uncovering fraud 
against the United States Government; its goal is to “supplement 
federal law enforcement resources by encouraging private citizens to 
 
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
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uncover fraud on the government.”8 Because the FCA is a federal 
statute, a complaint filed pursuant to the FCA is analyzed for 
sufficiency under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).9 
A.  The False Claims Act 
The FCA aims to “protect[] the federal fisc by imposing severe 
penalties on those whose false or fraudulent claims cause the 
government to pay money.”10 Congress passed the FCA in 1863 to crack 
down on fraud perpetrated by Union Army suppliers in government 
defense contracts during the Civil War.11 The FCA encourages private 
citizens, called relators, to file qui tam12 cases reporting attempts to 
defraud the government.13 The increase in qui tam cases filed in the last 
two decades is dramatic. For example, in 1987 only 30 qui tam cases 
were filed, but in 2013, 753 qui tam cases were filed, resulting in 
recoveries of over $3 billion.14 One of the principal uses of the FCA is 
to battle fraud in the health-care field, covering false claims submitted 
to Medicare and Medicaid by health-care providers.15 A relator who 
successfully submits a claim of fraud will receive between fifteen and 
twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement. 16 
Recovery under the FCA can be substantial; for example, “[t]he 
 
8. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 727 (1st Cir. 2007). 
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
10. United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2011). 
11. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 184 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (“The Act is remedial, first passed at the behest of President 
Lincoln in 1863 to stem widespread fraud by private Union Army 
suppliers in Civil War defense contracts.”). 
12. Qui tam is an abbreviation of qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso 
in hac parte sequitur, which means “who as well for the king as for himself 
sues in this matter.” Qui Tam Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014). A qui tam is a lawsuit brought by a private citizen against a 
person or company who is believed to have violated the law in the 
performance of a contract with the government or in violation of a 
government regulation. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (“A person 
may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and 
for the United States Government.”). 
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 allows only the U.S. Attorney General or a private citizen 
action as a whistleblower to file under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012). 
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 726–27 (1st Cir. 2007). 
14. Fraud Statistics Overview Oct. 1, 1987–Sept. 30, 2013, Civil Div., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013
/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QDCVUQG] 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2015).  
15. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001). 
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012). 
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healthcare industry alone accounted for over $9.5 billion in recoveries 
by the U.S. Department of Justice” from 2009 to 2012.17 
Generally, the FCA “indicate[s] a purpose to reach any person who 
knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were 
grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct 
contractual relations with the government.”18 The FCA holds liable any 
person who (1) knowingly submits false claims to the government; (2) 
causes another to submit false claims; (3) conspires to violate the FCA; 
or (4) knowingly makes or uses a false record to get a false claim paid 
by the Government.19 
Consequently, “[t]he statute attaches liability, not to the underlying 
fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to 
the ‘claim for payment.’ Therefore, a central question in False Claims 
Act cases is whether the defendant ever presented a ‘false or fraudulent 
claim’ to the government.”20 Liability is not triggered simply by submit-
ting a false claim; the potentially liable party must have knowledge that 
they are submitting a false claim.21 The FCA defines knowledge as 
“actual knowledge,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the 
information,” or “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the inform-
ation;” however, proof of specific intent to defraud is not required.22 A 
person found liable for this conduct must pay a civil penalty between 
$5,000 and $10,000 plus three times the amount of the government’s 
 
17. Martin Merritt & Rachel V. Rose, Pleading “Healthcare Fraud and 
Abuse” Under the False Claims Act, Surviving Rule 9(b) and Rule 
12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss, Fed. Lawyer, May 2013, at 63, available 
at http://www.slideshare.net/MartinMerritt2/pleading-healthcare-fraud- 
and-abuse-rule-9b-12-b-6-merritt-rose-05-13?from_action=save 
[http://perma.cc/U8ES-HBMX] (referencing statistics from the Office 
of Public Affairs of U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
18. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544–55 (1943). 
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2012). The FCA also holds liable any 
person who: (1) has control over government property and knowingly 
delivers less than all of that property; (2) is authorized to deliver a 
document certifying receipt of property used by the Government and 
delivers it without completely knowing that the information on the receipt 
is true; and (3) knowingly buys public property from a Government 
employee who may not sell the property. Id. 
20. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 
709 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
21. United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contracting 
Co., 612 F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Congress . . . has made plain 
its intention that the act not punish honest mistakes or incorrect claims 
submitted through mere negligence.”). 
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). 
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damages.23 In order to successfully bring a qui tam action, a relator 
must meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b). 
B. The Rule 9(b) Pleading Standard 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that“[i]n 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, 
and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”24 
The Rule 9(b) requirement must be read in conjunction with 
Rule 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim.25 
Therefore, merely focusing on the fact that Rule 9(b) requires 
particularity fails to take into account “the general simplicity and flexi-
bility” contemplated by Rule 8(a).26 When read in conjunction with 
Rule 8(a), it becomes clear that Rule 9(b) does not require absolute 
particularity.27 Many courts require a relator under the FCA to allege 
the time, place, and content of the fraud as well as allegations that the 
false claim was actually submitted to the government.28 
The main purpose of Rule 9(b) is to apprise defendants of the 
fraudulent claims and acts that form the basis for a claim.29  The 
 
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). 
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
25. See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185–86 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“The particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) is 
supplemental to the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8(a) 
requiring ‘enough facts [taken as true] to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”); Barney J. Finberg, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Provision of Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
That Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake be Stated with 
Particularity, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 407, §2[a] (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
26. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1298 (3d ed. 2004). 
27. Id.; see United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1386 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (quoting 2A James William Moore, Federal Practice § 9.03, 
at 9-28 (2d ed. 1980)) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he requirement of particularity 
does not abrogate Rule 8 . . . it should be harmonized with . . . sub-
divisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8.”); see also Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 185–86 (stating 
that Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)).  
28. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 
1301, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that fraud or mistake claims 
under the FCA must be stated with particularity and that a competitor 
failed to allege with specificity if or when a corporation submitted any 
improper claims to the government). 
29. See Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Gottreich v. San Francisco Investment Corp., 552 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 
1977)) (holding that pleading under Rule 9(b) “is sufficient if it identifies 
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particularity requirement also protects against vexatious and frivolous 
claims. 30  All circuit courts that have considered the issue have 
concluded that Rule 9(b) should apply to qui tam actions under the 
FCA.31 However, “the degree of particularity necessary to enable the 
pleading to withstand attack . . . must in practical application necess-
arily vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.”32 According 
to the D.C. Circuit, “Rule 9(b) is mitigated by Rule 8’s short and plain 
statement language, and the simplicity and flexibility contemplated by 
the rules must be taken into account when reviewing a complaint for 
9(b) particularity.” 33  The debate over what degree of particularity 
should be applied in FCA cases has caused a circuit split. 
II. Circuit Court Application of the  
Rule 9(B) Standard 
When analyzing circuit court decisions in FCA cases, the need for 
a uniform test becomes apparent. The circuit courts are split in their 
application of Rule 9(b) to claims filed under the FCA. The circuits 
range from a flexible application of Rule 9(b) to a strict adherence to 
the Rule’s particularity requirement. For example, the First Circuit 
held that Rule 9(b) may be satisfied even where “some questions 
remain unanswered [but] the complaint as a whole is sufficiently partic-
ular to pass muster under the FCA.”34 However, the Eleventh Circuit 
strictly applied Rule 9(b) to require that relators plead specific details 
as to time, place, and substance of the fraudulent acts as well as who 
 
‘the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare 
an adequate answer from the allegations’”). 
30. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 
1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding general allegations of FCA violations 
by failing to comply with certification requirements under the Truth 
Negotiations Act and the accompanying FAR regulating government 
contracts did not state a claim with sufficient particularity). 
31. E.g., United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 
556 (8th Cir. 2006); Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 185; United States ex rel. 
Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2004). 
32. Finberg, supra note 25; see also Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 188 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997)) 
(“[W]e have acknowledged that ‘Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is context-
specific,’ and thus there is no single construction of Rule 9(b) that applies 
in all contexts.”). 
33. United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 
F. Supp. 2d 114, 117 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing United States ex rel. Joseph 
v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385–86 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
34. United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 732 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(citing Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233 n.17). 
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engaged in them.35 There have been no guiding principles established 
which courts can use to decide whether a complaint satisfies Rule 9(b). 
The result is that courts fall along a spectrum of rigid to flexible app-
lication of the particularity requirement and consider many different 
variables such as the status of the relator, reliability of information, 
notice to the defendant, and personal knowledge. 
A complaint filed under the FCA that (1) pleads sufficient detail of 
a fraudulent scheme and (2) provides reliable indicia of fraudulent 
claims to conclude that false claims have been filed should satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 9(b). All courts should consider similar factors 
when determining if reliable indicia have been provided. Finally—
although many courts take it into consideration—the relationship the 
relator has to the defendant is immaterial to that determination. The 
circuits that have addressed pleading requirements under the FCA take 
three main approaches: (1) the representative samples approach—an 
inflexible application of Rule 9(b); (2) the status of the relator 
approach; and (3) the flexible approach. 
A. The Representative Samples Approach 
A few circuits rigidly apply Rule 9(b), requiring relators to plead 
specific details of individual instances of fraud, often referred to as the 
representative samples approach.36 
The Eleventh Circuit applies the most inflexible application of 
Rule 9(b). In United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of 
America,37 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a relator’s 
complaint for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) standard.38 Here, the court, 
while declining to apply a more flexible standard, suggested that a 
complaint is sufficient if it pleads an overall scheme and indicia of 
reliability. 39  The Clausen court, however, made it clear that the 
complaint would satisfy the indicia of reliability only if the complaint 
 
35. See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 
1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (requiring “some indicia of reliability” in the 
complaint sufficient “to support the allegation of an actual false claim for 
payment being made to the Government”). 
36. A representative sample, generally, is a specific example of false claims 
submitted to the government for payment. Many courts specify that a 
representative sample details the “time, place, and content” of the false 
claims. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., 
Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455–56 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding “that the district court 
properly dismissed the amended complaint” for failure to properly allege 
that “false claims were presented to the government for payment”). 
37.  290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002). 
38. Id. at 1315. 
39. Id. at 1311. 
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included allegations of the specific contents of actually submitted 
claims, such as billing numbers, dates, and amounts.40 
Many circuits only require representative samples in some 
situations. The Fourth Circuit requires representative samples only 
“when a defendant’s actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from 
the allegations, could have led, but need not necessarily have led, to 
the submission of false claims.”41 In United States ex rel. Nathan v. 
Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc.,42 the court explicitly 
declined to apply a “relaxed construction of Rule 9(b).”43 Even though 
the relator alleged that doctors wrote almost one hundred prescriptions 
for the drug in question, he failed to allege that the prescriptions were 
written for off-label uses or that patients ever filled the prescriptions.44 
Overall, the court found that the complaint was insufficient because it 
could not draw a plausible inference connecting the general statistics 
alleged to the prescriptions identified.45 The court determined that the 
allegations in the complaint were too general because the relator did 
not “identify with particularity any claims that would trigger liability 
under the Act.”46 
Similarly, the First Circuit requires a relator to provide at least 
some representative samples: 
[A] relator must provide details that identify particular false 
claims for payment that were submitted to the government. In a 
case such as this, details concerning the dates of the claims, the 
content of the forms or bills submitted, their identification num-
bers, the amount of money charged to the government, the partic-
ular goods or services for which the government was billed, the 
individuals involved in the billing, and the length of time between 
the alleged fraudulent practices and the submission of claims 
based on those practices are the types of information that may 
help a relator to state his or her claims with particularity. These 
details do not constitute a checklist of mandatory requirements 
that must be satisfied by each allegation included in a complaint. 
However, . . . we believe that “some of this information for at 
 
40. Id. at 1311–13. 
41. Nathan, 707 F.3d at 457. 
42.  707 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013). 
43. Id. at 457–58. 
44. Id. at 459–60. 
45. Id. at 459. 
46. Id. at 460. 
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least some of the claims must be pleaded in order to satisfy 
Rule 9(b).”47 
While these circuits have rigidly applied Rule 9(b) to FCA cases, 
other circuits have taken a more lenient approach. 
B. The Status of the Relator Approach 
Several circuits apply a flexible interpretation of Rule 9(b) only 
when the court deems the relator to have some level of “insider” 
status—that is the relator has personal, firsthand knowledge of the 
submission of false claims to the government.48 In United States ex rel. 
Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,49 the Eighth Circuit 
held that a relator with personal, firsthand knowledge of the submission 
of false claims can satisfy Rule 9(b) without representative examples 
by pleading “particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired 
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were 
actually submitted.”50 The court compared this holding with its holding 
in United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital,51 where it held that 
“to satisfy Rule 9(b), [the relator] was required to plead at least some 
representative examples of the false claims” because he “had no direct 
connection to the hospital’s billing or claims department and could only 
speculate that false claims were submitted.”52 While Thayer oversaw 
Planned Parenthood’s billing and claims systems and, therefore, had  
47. United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 123 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield 
Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 232–33 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
48. Status of the relator refers to the way many courts categorize a relator as 
either an “insider” or “outsider” depending on what position they hold 
within the company or organization. For example, some courts would 
consider an employee of the billing department as an insider, but a doctor 
in the same hospital an “outsider.” Compare United States ex rel. Thayer 
v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(the relator was the center of the defendant clinic and oversaw the billing 
and claims system of defendant clinic) with United States ex rel. Joshi v. 
St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006) (the relator anesthesi-
ologist was held not to be privy to certain details related to his claims). 
Although this categorization of relators is wholly irrelevant, the terms 
“relator” or “outsider” as used throughout this Note do not include 
relators who receive information to bring an FCA claim through public 
knowledge and would thus fall under the Original Source provision of 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). See Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 986–87 (8th Cir. 
2003) (discussing whether the relator’s factual allegations were drawn 
from publicly disclosed information and thus barred). 
49.  765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014). 
50. Id. at 918. 
51. 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006). 
52. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 917 (discussing Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557). 
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firsthand knowledge of the false claims, Joshi was an anesthesiologist 
with no direct connection to the hospital’s billing department.53 The 
Eighth Circuit applies a more lenient pleading standard when the 
relator has personal, firsthand knowledge of the actual submission of 
the false claims; therefore, a doctor in the hospital would have to pro-
vide representative samples, but an employee of the billing department 
would not, simply because of his status or relationship to the defendant. 
Although the Sixth Circuit generally requires a relator to plead 
“‘characteristic example[s]’ that are ‘illustrative of [the] class’ of all 
claims covered by the fraudulent scheme,”54 in United States ex rel. 
Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C.,55 the court did not foreclose the possibility 
of a relaxed pleading standard for a relator with firsthand knowledge: 
The case law just discussed suggests that the requirement that a 
relator identify an actual false claim may be relaxed when, even 
though the relator is unable to produce an actual billing or 
invoice, he or she has pled facts which support a strong inference 
that a claim was submitted. Such an inference may arise when 
the relator has “personal knowledge that the claims were sub-
mitted by Defendants . . . for payment.”56 
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit allows some flexibility for a 
relator who does not have personal, firsthand knowledge. The court in 
United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.57 held that 
“Rule 9(b) does not require plaintiffs to allege every fact pertaining to 
every instance of fraud when a scheme spans several years.”58 The court 
allowed some flexibility for certain relators stating that “[i]t is certainly 
true that qui tam plaintiffs . . . often have difficulty getting access to . 
. . documents. Accordingly, this circuit provides an avenue for plaintiffs 
unable to meet the particularity standard because defendants control 
the relevant documents—plaintiffs in such straits may allege lack of 
access in the complaint.”59 
These circuits recognize the advantages of a more flexible pleading 
standard. The D.C. Circuit in particular recognizes the prejudice to 
relators that can result from informational asymmetry. There are, 
 
53.  Id. at 917. 
54. United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 506 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
55. United States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011). 
56. Id. at 471 (quoting United States ex rel. Lane v. Murfreesboro 
Dermatology Clinic, PLC, 2010 WL 1926131, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)). 
57.  389 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
58. Id. at 1259. 
59. Id. at 1258. 
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however, several circuits that apply Rule 9(b) flexibly in all situations, 
not just in certain circumstances. 
C. The Flexible Approach 
Several circuits always allow a flexible pleading standard for an 
FCA relator. For example, the Third Circuit addressed the pleading 
requirement in United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Management LLC,60 where the relator alleged that the defendant over-
billed the government for a certain prescription drug.61 Although the 
court recognized this was a “close case as to meeting the requirements 
of Rule 9(b),” the court found that the complaint was sufficient and 
rejected the representative samples approach.62 The court stated that, 
accepting the relator’s factual allegations as true, there were records 
showing that less than a normal amount of the drug was used and that 
Medicare would reimburse for a full vial of the drug regardless of how 
much was used, thus providing an opportunity for the alleged fraud.63 
Stating that “it is hard to reconcile the text of the FCA, which does 
not require that the exact content of the false claims in question be 
shown, with the ‘representative samples’ standard,”64 the court noted 
that “we had never ‘held that a plaintiff must identify a specific claim 
for payment at the pleading stage of the case to state a claim for 
relief.’”65  
The Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff is not required to “provide 
a factual basis for every allegation.”66 In United States ex rel. Lemmon 
v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.,67 the relators observed and participated in 
the improper disposal of hazardous waste.68 The court held that as long 
 
60.  United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt. LLC, 754 F.3d 153 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
61. Id. at 158. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 156. 
65. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 
F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011)). The Third Circuit also referenced that Fifth 
Circuit’s holding in Grubbs that “requiring this sort of detail at the 
pleading stage would be ‘one small step shy of requiring production of 
actual documentation with the complaint, a level of proof not demanded 
to win at trial and significantly more than any federal pleading rule 
contemplates.’” Id. (citing United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 
565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
66. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 
1173 (10th Cir. 2010). 
67. 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010). 
68. Id. at 1166. 
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as the relator provides (1) details of the fraudulent scheme and (2) “an 
adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false claims were 
submitted” the Rule 9(b) standard has been met.69 
Similarly, a relator in the Fifth Circuit need not allege details of 
each false claim, but the relator must “provide other reliable indications 
of fraud and . . . plead a level of detail that demonstrates that an alleged 
scheme likely resulted in bills submitted for government payment.”70 In 
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,71 the relator alleged that 
two doctors personally instructed him to contribute to a fraudulent 
billing scheme.72 In his complaint, the relator described the scheme in 
detail as well as “one overt act of false billing for each doctor.”73 The 
court held that the complaint could “survive by alleging particular 
details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia 
that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.”74 
When the logical conclusion of the allegations of a relator’s complaint 
is that false claims were presented to the government, it is sufficient 
under Rule 9(b) “even though it does not include exact billing numbers 
or amounts.”75 
The Ninth Circuit adopted a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in 
United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz.76 Notably, the court held that 
the relator must plead (1) “particular details of a scheme to submit 
false claims” and (2) “reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference 
that claims were actually submitted.”77 The court does not require 
relators to provide representative samples; instead, representative 
samples are simply one way of meeting the reliable indicia prong of the 
test.78 Even though the court acknowledged that a somewhat flexible 
pleading standard would apply, it found the relator’s complaint 
insufficient. The relator merely alleged that certain health care bus-
inesses “were engaged in the unlawful corporate practice of medicine.”79 
The court noted that the relator “baldly assert[ed]” that, had the 
 
69. Id. at 1172. 
70. United States ex rel. Nunnally v. West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital, 519 
F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2013). 
71. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009). 
72. Id. at 184. 
73. Id. at 184–85. 
74. Id. at 190. 
75. Id. at 192. 
76. United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010). 
77. Id. at 998–99 (citing Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190). 
78. Id. at 998. 
79. Id. at 1000. 
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defendant “not concealed or failed to disclose information affecting the 
right to payment, the United States would not have paid the claims” 
without providing “any statute, rule, regulation, or contract that 
conditions payment on compliance with state law governing the 
corporate practice of medicine.” 80  Because the relator’s complaint 
contained only conclusory allegations “lacking any details or facts 
setting out the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the ‘financial 
relationship’ or alleged referrals,” his complaint was insufficient.81 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-
Royce Corp. 82  rejected the notion that representative samples are 
required, reversing a district court holding that the relator needed to 
have “at least one of [defendant’s] billing packages” to meet the 
Rule 9(b) standard.83 The defendant argued that the relator’s com-
plaint was insufficient because, although he was an engineer for the 
company, he was not an insider and did not have access to invoices sent 
to customers.84 The court found the relator’s statement that “Rolls–
Royce must have submitted at least one such certificate [of compliance], 
or the military services would not have paid for the goods” as sufficient, 
85 holding that because “knowledge is inferential,” it is enough to “show, 
in detail, the nature of the charge, so that vague and unsubstantiated 
accusations of fraud do not lead to costly discovery and public 
obloquy.”86 Even though the relator did not have personal knowledge 
of the details of the particular fraudulent claims, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the complaint was sufficient because it alleged the scheme.87 
III. A More Flexible Standard Fulfills the Purpose 
behind Rule 9(B) and Provides Fair Access to the 
Judicial System for Relators 
The confusion and discord surrounding pleading requirements in 
FCA cases arises from the lack of a definitive test to determine the 
sufficiency of a complaint and the lack of identifiable factors that courts 
can weigh when applying the test. Many courts have stated that a 
relator must show details of the scheme and some indicia of reliability; 




82. United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2009). 
83. Id. at 854. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 854–55. 
86. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 
1310 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
87. Id. at 854. 
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reliability differently and, therefore, have varied results. Further, many 
courts have incorrectly allowed the status of the relator to affect the 
pleading requirement. All courts should consider the same factors when 
determining what constitutes indicia of reliability, and they should 
reject the representative samples and status of the relator approaches. 
Applying a uniform, flexible test will prevent courts from placing an 
unfair pleading burden on relators while still satisfying the Rule 9(b) 
pleading requirement. 
A. A Flexible Application of Rule 9(b) Provides Notice to the 
Defendant and Does Not Unfairly Prejudice Relators 
Rule 9(b) “is context specific and flexible and must remain so to 
achieve the remedial purpose of the False Claims Act.”88 Fulfilling the 
purpose behind Rule 9(b) is essential in evaluating an FCA complaint. 
Rule 9(b) strives mainly to put defendants on notice and allow them 
to prepare an appropriate defense. 89  Further, it serves to protect 
defendants from frivolous claims and deter cases filed purely for settle-
ment value, merely to reopen a completed transaction, or only to obtain 
discovery.90 Therefore, “[a] court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint 
under Rule 9(b) if the court is satisfied (1) that the defendant has been 
made aware of the particular circumstances for which she will have to 
prepare a defense at trial, and (2) that plaintiff has substantial 
prediscovery evidence of those facts.”91 
To achieve the purpose behind Rule 9(b), the pleading standard 
must remain flexible in FCA cases. Without flexibility, the “remedial 
purpose” of the FCA cannot be achieved.92 Namely, “[w]e reach for a 
workable construction of Rule 9(b) with complaints under the False 
Claims Act; that is, one that effectuates Rule 9(b) without stymieing 
legitimate efforts to expose fraud.”93 A flexible application of Rule 9(b) 
in which a relator must satisfy the two-part test of (1) pleading details  
88. United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009). 
89. Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Gottreich 
v. San Franscisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
90. Charis Ann Mitchell, Comment, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity 
Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Liberty U. 
L. Rev. 337, 344 (2010); see United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. 
Servs. Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that Rule 9(b) 
is meant to ensure that defendants have a chance to prepare their defense 
and to discourage fraud claims solely as a pretext for discovery of 
unknown wrongs or purely for nuisance value). 
91. United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 
F. Supp. 2d 114, 116 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse 
Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
92. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
93. Id. 
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of the overall scheme and (2) presenting sufficient indicia of reliability 
strikes a balance that protects defendants while preventing plaintiff 
from filing baseless claims.94 The test is flexible enough to not preclude 
meritorious claims from going forward while providing defendants ade-
quate notice of the claims. 
Further, a complaint that complies with the flexible, two-part test 
would limit any “fishing” as the Fifth Circuit explained: 
Discovery can be pointed and efficient, with a summary judgment 
following on the heels of the complaint if billing records discredit 
the complaint’s particularized allegations. That is the balance 
Rule 9(b) attempts to strike. And it works best when access to 
discovery does not inevitably include all discovery’s powers but is 
tailored by the district court to the case at hand. And the detail 
must be sufficient to allow this tailoring. Rule 9(b) should not be 
made to shoulder all the burden of policing abusive discovery.95 
In Grubbs, the Fifth Circuit found that a requirement that a relator 
plead representative samples such as “exact dollar amounts, billing 
numbers, or dates” is “one small step shy of requiring production of 
actual documentation”—a level of proof not demanded by the 
Rule 9(b) standard—and, therefore, rejected an inflexible application 
of the Rule.96 
In Foglia, the Third Circuit relied on the Attorney General’s brief 
for the United States as amicus curiae in Nathan to add further support 
for its finding that a flexible pleading standard should apply.97 In the 
brief, the Attorney General stated that (1) the “rigid” pleading stand-
ard is “unsupported by Rule 9(b)”; (2) “a strict pleading standard 
undermines the FCA’s effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against 
the United States”; and (3) “pleading the details of a specific false claim  
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 191. 
96. Id. at 189–90 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308 (2007)); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. 
of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 (D.D.C. 2002) (“If at trial a qui 
tam plaintiff proves the existence of a billing scheme and offers particular 
and reliable indicia that false bills were actually submitted as a result of 
the scheme—such as dates that services were fraudulently provided or 
recorded, by whom, and evidence of the department’s standard billing 
procedure—a reasonable jury could infer that more likely than not the 
defendant presented a false bill to the government, this despite no 
evidence of the particular contents of the misrepresentation.”). 
97. United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management LLC, 754 
F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 10–11, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. 
N. Am., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 12–1249) (mem.) (denying cert. 
to 707 F.3d 451)). 
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presented to the government is not an indispensable requirement of a 
viable FCA complaint.”98 
The Third Circuit agreed that a more “nuanced” standard fulfills 
the purpose behind Rule 9(b) of providing fair notice to defendants of 
a plaintiff’s claims without prejudicing the relator.99 A defendant will 
be able to adequately defend against the claim because many times the 
defendant is the party who is in possession of the records that are 
necessary to show that the alleged false claims were never billed for.100 
If a relator is prevented from going forward with his claim simply 
because he does not have access to the information needed to provide 
representative samples in his complaint, a meritorious claim may be 
dismissed. In other words, “[f]actual sufficiency is . . . a poor proxy for 
meritlessness. . . . It overscreens cases that, though meritorious, cannot 
meet the fact pleading standard before discovery.”101 Further, “[t]he 
overscreening effect is a significant inroad into justice concerns because 
it prevents deserving plaintiffs from gaining meaningful access to the 
civil justice system.”102 If a meritorious claim cannot get past the plead-
ing stage, due to a strict pleading bar, discovery is not even an option.103 
Relators who are held to a strict pleading standard under Rule 9(b) 
in FCA cases experience the same adverse effects that plaintiffs 
complained of after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly 104  and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105  which required plaintiffs to 
include far more detailed facts in a complaint to survive a motion to 
dismiss.106 Here too, relators would be adversely affected because they 
would be forced to provide more detailed facts than they have available 
to them, causing their case to be dismissed before it can be evaluated 
on the merits. Studies show that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal have led to increased dismissals at the motion to 
dismiss stage. 107  A strict application of Rule 9(b), which requires 
 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 156–57. 
100. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190–91. 
101.  Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 68 (2010). 
102. Id.  
103. Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present 
a Catch-22, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 16, 17. 
104.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
105.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
106. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662. 
107. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme 
Court, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 193, 196, 201 (2014). 
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relators to plead details they do not have access to, simply places an 
unfair burden on relators. 
Finally, requiring a relator to plead representative samples would 
discourage relators from coming forward with information of false 
claims.108 An inflexible application of Rule 9(b) would “take[] a big bite 
out of qui tam litigation” because a relator is unlikely to have access to 
these documents unless he works in the defendant’s billing depart-
ment.109 
B.  The Test 
In order to have a consistent, predictable application of Rule 9(b), 
courts should adopt a uniform, flexible standard. The focus of this test 
should be on whether the relator provided (1) details of the overall 
scheme and (2) indicia of reliability. In applying Rule 9(b), “courts 
must undertake a case-by-case analysis of particular pleadings;” 110 
however, a relator’s complaint is sufficient if the “accusations are not 
vague”111 and the defendants can “defend against the charge and not 
just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 112  Representative 
examples of each individual false claim submitted are not required if 
the relator details the overall fraudulent scheme and provides an 
adequate basis for the court to infer that false claims were actually 
submitted to the government. 
1.  Prong One: Details of the Overall Scheme 
This prong of the test can be satisfied by pleading the when, where, 
how, and what of the overall fraudulent scheme. This prong looks at 
the scheme in general because “[t]he particular circumstances consti-
tuting the fraudulent presentment are often harbored in the scheme.”113 
The Fifth Circuit has stated as much:  
Standing alone, raw bills—even with numbers, dates, and 
amounts—are not fraud without an underlying scheme to submit 
the bills for unperformed or unnecessary work. It is the scheme in  
108. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 191 (“It discourages whistleblowers who may 
have significant information from coming forward . . . .”). 
109. United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
110. United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 33 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting In re Orion Sec. Litig., No. 08–CV–1328, 
2009 WL 2601952, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009)). 
111. Lusby, 570 F.3d at 855. 
112. United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 
1251, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States ex rel. Lee v. 
SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
113. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
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which particular circumstances constituting fraud may be found 
that make it highly likely the fraud was consummated through 
the presentment of false bills.114 
A relator can satisfy this prong by alleging how the fraud was 
carried out as well as the “date, place, and participants” of the fraud.115 
Even if a relator cannot match every fraudulent act with a specific 
request for payment to the government, the complaint can provide 
sufficient details of the overall scheme if, for example, the relator alleges 
which employees submitted the false claims, which government reg-
ulation or contract was violated, when the requests were made, and 
how the regulation or contract was violated.116 For example, the relator 
in Thayer satisfied this prong by providing the names of the individuals 
who instructed her to commit the fraudulent acts, the time period over 
which the fraud took place, which clinics participated in the schemes, 
and the means by which the fraud was executed.117 
2.  Prong Two: Indicia of Reliability 
The next prong of the test evaluates the indicia of reliability. The 
indicia of reliability can be any “factual or statistical evidence to 
strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility.”118 Any adequate 
basis from which the court can infer that false claims were actually 
submitted to the government should be considered sufficient indicia of 
reliability. Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement does not necessarily 
need to be met by stating the exact contents of a bill to the govern-
ment.119 If a relator provides the underlying factual basis for the alle-




115. Id. at 191–92. 
116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 
F.3d 1163, 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding a former employee’s claims that 
the former employer directed the employee to participate in fraud, that 
the former employer breached its contractual and statutory obligations, 
and that the former employer submitted false certifications of fulfillment 
of those obligations sufficient to pass pleading stage). 
117. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 
F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2014). 
118. See United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 733 (1st Cir. 
2007) (holding the relator’s claims were not sufficient because they 
contained no factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the fraud 
inference beyond possibility). 
119. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190 (holding that a relator’s complaint which does 
not allege the details of a submitted false claim may nevertheless survive). 
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A relator can satisfy this prong in many ways; however, no matter 
how the second prong is satisfied, it is imperative that the notice to the 
defendant requirement is fulfilled. First, personal knowledge of the 
fraud can satisfy the indicia of reliability requirement.120 In Lemmon, 
the relator satisfied this prong of the test through his personal 
knowledge of the false claims. His personal knowledge was sufficient 
because he participated in the improper disposal of the waste. 121 
Similarly, in Grubbs, the relator satisfied this prong by alleging his 
firsthand experience of the doctors approaching to participate in the 
fraud and the nursing staff attempting to assist him in recording patient 
visits that had not occurred.122 
Second, specific contents of actually submitted claims, such as 
billing numbers, dates, and amounts can satisfy the indicia of reliability 
requirement. Although the relator in Clausen described in detail a 
fraudulent scheme, his complaint was insufficient because it did not 
provide “any billing information to support [Clausen’s] allegation that 
actual false claims were submitted for payment.”123 Where the realtor 
merely alleged, “these practices resulted in the submission of false 
claims for payment to the United States,”124 the court wanted contents 
of actually submitted false claims stating, “[n]o amounts of charges were 
identified. No actual dates were alleged. No policies about billing or 
even second-hand information about billing practices were des-
cribed. . . . No copy of a single bill or payment was provided.”125 
Finally, details about the defendant’s billing practices can satisfy 
the indicia of reliability requirement. In Thayer, the relator alleged that 
her position as manager gave her access to Planned Parenthood’s 
centralized billing system.126 She also alleged that she had personal 
 
120. See United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 
2010) (stating that the FCA is “geared primarily to encourage insiders to 
disclose information necessary to prevent fraud on the government”); see 
also Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27956, at *14-15 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that because the relator 
“worked in the very department where she alleged the fraudulent billing 
schemes occurred,” she was “privy to . . . the internal billing practices” 
of the defendant and her allegations of false claims were factually credible). 
121. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 
1169, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2010). 
122. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 184, 191–92. 
123. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1306 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
124. Id. at 1312. 
125. Id. 
126. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 
765 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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knowledge of the submission of false claims and described Planned 
Parenthood’s general billing practices.127 These allegations were enough 
to satisfy the indicia of reliability requirement.128 
In sum, personal knowledge, specific details of submitted claims, 
and details of the defendants billing practices are all ways in which a 
relator can provide indicia of reliability to satisfy the second prong of 
the test. This is contrary to the rule used in circuits that have adopted 
the representative samples approach or the status of the relator 
approach because those circuits held that a relator can provide indicia 
of reliability in only one manner. Courts should accept personal 
knowledge, representative samples, or details of the defendant’s billing 
practices as sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the test instead of 
limiting relators to just one method. The courts that have restricted 
relators to only one method of showing indicia of reliably are incorrect 
because any of the three methods discussed above would put a 
defendant on notice of the claims. 
3.  The Status of the Relator Approach Should be Rejected 
A relator should not be held to a more flexible pleading standard 
simply because a court finds that he had personal, firsthand knowledge 
of the claims or classifies him as an “insider.” In affirming the dismissal 
of a complaint for failure to meet Rule 9(b), the Eighth Circuit stated 
that “[t]he [FCA] is intended to encourage individuals who are either 
close observers or involved in the fraudulent, activity to come forward, 
and is not intended to create windfalls for people with secondhand 
knowledge of the wrongdoing.”129 Although it is important to keep in 
mind that the objective of uncovering fraud must be balanced against 
the fact that the ability to bring whistleblower claims may prompt 




129. United States ex rel. Kinney v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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can provide reliable indicia without having firsthand knowledge. 130 
Courts must hold all relators to the same standard.131 
The FCA does not require that a relator be an insider to bring suit; 
anyone who is aware of false claims against the government may bring 
suit.132 Accordingly, “[i]t is generally contemplated that an FCA relator 
will be an insider, and Congress certainly intended to encourage insider 
whistleblowers to initiate qui tam suits. However, the statute contains 
no such requirement.”133 The application of either a rigid or a flexible 
pleading standard merely on the basis of the relator’s status is arbitrary 
and distracting. For example, the Eighth Circuit only allows a more 
flexible pleading standard for a relator who has firsthand knowledge of 
the submission of the false claims.134 Specifically, the court required the 
relator to plead representative samples in Joshi, but not in Thayer 
because the relator was an “insider.”135 The Eighth Circuit applies a 
more lenient pleading standard when the relator has firsthand 
knowledge of the actual submission of the false claims. Therefore, 
someone who works in the billing department at a hospital would have 
a more flexible pleading standard than a doctor in that same hospital. 
 
130. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 
649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives 
for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and 
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant inform-
ation to contribute of their own, Congress has frequently altered its course 
in drafting and amending the qui tam provisions since initial passage of the 
FCA over a century ago.”); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech 
Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Congress has amended the 
FCA several times ‘to walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing 
and discouraging opportunistic behavior.’” (citing United States ex rel. S. 
Prawer and Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320, 324–26 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
131. Again, this excludes relators who receive their information through public 
knowledge and are thus subject to the “original source” rule. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4) (2012); see supra note 48. 
132. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (setting forth a limitation on who can bring 
suit and stating that a court must dismiss a claim based on publicly 
disclosed information unless the relator is the original source). 
133. United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 251 
F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing United States ex rel. LaCorte 
v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs, 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
134. Compare United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the 
Heartland, 765 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that a flexible 
standard applied when the relator was the center manager of the defendant 
who oversaw the defendant’s billing system) with United States ex rel. 
Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that a relator, as the defendant hospital’s anesthesiologist, must provide 
specific details of the claim in order to receive a relaxed pleading standard). 
135. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 917 (discussing Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557). 
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The FCA does not differentiate based on the status of the relator. 
Some courts have recognized that making a distinction based on the 
status of the relator is arbitrary. The court’s holding in United States 
ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Technology Services, Inc.136 is illustrative of 
this: 
[The defendant] asserts that Congress created a policy in the FCA 
that relators must be insiders. This is not the case. . . . [T]he 
statute contains no such requirement. Any person who can muster 
sufficient evidence of fraud, that is not publicly disclosed, and be 
the first to file a complaint alleging that fraud, may maintain a 
qui tam suit. In fact, the statute contemplates that a competitor—
manifestly not an insider—may file suit.137 
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia in United 
States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,138 rejected 
the notion that a relator must be an insider.139 
C. Courts Have Accepted a More Flexible Application of Rule 9(b) in 
Other Instances of Alleged Fraud 
FCA suits are not the only area of the law in which courts have 
allowed a more flexible pleading standard. Courts that have allowed a 
flexible application of Rule 9(b) have mainly done so in instances where 
the plaintiff would be prejudiced because the defendant possesses the 
information that the plaintiff needs in order to plead with specificity. 
Some courts have allowed a more lenient application of Rule 9(b) 
to complaints alleging violation of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA).140 For example, in Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc.,141 
the court recognized that plaintiffs may not be able to provide 
representative samples in market manipulation claims under the 
PSLRA because the information needed may be “peculiarly within the 
defendant’s knowledge or control.”142 Therefore, the court relaxed the 
 
136. United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20 
(D.D.C. 2010). 
137. Folliard., 722 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.9 (citing United States ex rel. McCready v. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
138. 251 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.D.C. 2003). 
139. Id. at 119. 
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). 
141. Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 615 (D.N.J. 2003). 
142. Id. at 628 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 
198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Reevaluating the Pleading 
Requirements for Market Manipulation Claims, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 763, 
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pleading requirement.143 Further, the court in In re Herbalife Securities 
Litigation144 noted that the Ninth Circuit relaxed Rule 9(b)’s require-
ments when the “matters at issue are within the opposing party’s know-
ledge.”145 “In such cases, the particularity requirement may be satisfied 
if the allegations are accompanied by a statement of the facts upon 
which belief is founded.”146 
There are several other areas in which courts have applied a relaxed 
Rule 9(b) standard. First, one court held that a Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint “need not be specific 
as to each allegation of mail or wire fraud when the nature of the RICO 
scheme is sufficiently pleaded so as to give notice to the defendants.”147 
In the context of a breach of contract case one court stated, “[a]lthough 
Rule 9(b) requires heightened specificity, courts should apply the rule 
with flexibility and ‘should not require plaintiffs to plead issues that 
may have been concealed by the defendants.’”148 Furthermore, in a com-
plaint alleging a securities law violation, one court held that Rule 9(b) 
is relaxed to permit discovery where the evidence is within a defendant’s 
exclusive possession.149 Finally, Rule 9(b) apples to adversary bank-
ruptcy proceedings;150 however, only a very simple allegation of fraud is 
enough to satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement.151 
These courts have mainly focused on the fact that if the pleading 
standard is not relaxed, an undue burden will be placed on the plaintiff 
because the defendant is in possession of the information needed to 
provide representative samples—the same problem that FCA relators 
face in jurisdictions with an inflexible pleading standard. 
 
777–87 (2004) (advocating for a relaxed application of Rule 9(b) in market 
manipulation claims under the PSLRA). 
143. Jones, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 628–29. 
144. In re Herbalife Sec. Litig., No. CV 95-400 SVW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11484 
(C.D. Cal. 1996). 
145. Id. at *18 (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 
(9th Cir. 1987)). 
146. Id. (citing Wool, 818 F.2d at 1439). 
147. Karreman v. Evergreen Int’l Spot Trading, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9824, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17812, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing First Interregional 
Advisors Corp. v. Wolff, 956 F. Supp. 480, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).  
148. Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 378, 385 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing 
Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
149. Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987). 
150. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7009. 
151. See, e.g., In re Tarragon Corp., No. 09-10555, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1001, 
at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2011) (construing Rule 9(b) “liberally” because a 
sophisticated defrauder could hide sufficient details of the fraud to make 
specific, particularized pleading impossible). 
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Conclusion 
The circuit courts have been inconsistent in their application of the 
Rule 9(b) particularity requirement to FCA complaints. Due to the 
lack of a specific test that can be applied to all relators’ complaints and 
specific criteria that can be applied in evaluating whether the test has 
been met, a relator’s complaint may be sufficient in one circuit but 
insufficient in another. Circuits that hold relators to an inflexible 
Rule 9(b) pleading standard are unfairly prejudicing relators who do 
not have access to information that is in the hands of the defendant. 
Therefore, the representative samples approach and the status of the 
relator approach should be rejected. 
When evaluating a relator’s complaint every court should consider 
whether the relator sufficiently alleged: (1) details of the overall 
fraudulent scheme and (2) indicia of reliability. Personal knowledge, 
specific details of submitted claims, or details of the defendants billing 
practices could fulfill the second prong. The two-part test will fulfill the 
purpose behind the enactment of Rule 9(b)—to put the defendant on 
notice of the allegations. It will also improve access to the judicial 
system for relators and allow the FCA to fulfill its remedial purpose. 
The test will ensure that the relator had reliable information that false 
claims were submitted without barring relators who cannot gain access 
to exact details like invoice numbers, dates, and dollar amounts. 
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